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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 64 2019 NUMBER 4
Third Circuit Review
EDITORS’ PREFACE
IN 1973, the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW launched the Third Circuit Review, aspecial compendium within the LAW REVIEW intended to survey prece-
dential opinions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit.1  In 2019 as we celebrate the Third Circuit Review’s 46th anniversary,
we use this opportunity to recount the Third Circuit Review’s robust history,
highlight distinguished contributors, and consider how the Third Circuit
Review may continue to provide value to our academic and practitioner
community.
When launching the Third Circuit Review, Volume XIX’s editors asked
Collins J. Seitz, then Chief Judge for Third Circuit, to write an introduc-
tion.2  Chief Judge Seitz identified a few guiding principles so that editors,
by “combining analysis with perspective,” could provide maximum value
“both to the judiciary and to the law.”3  While Chief Judge Seitz welcomed
critical analysis of the court’s opinions, his charge to the VILLANOVA LAW
REVIEW was not simply for editors to recite the court’s facts and holdings,
or to analyze its reasoning.  Instead, Chief Judge Seitz wrote that editors
were empowered to broadly contemplate the state of the law and the “par-
ticular faults or virtue of each decision” free from practical realities that
constrain judicial decision-making.4  In other words, the Third Circuit Re-
1. See Forward, 19 VILL. L. REV. 277 (1973).  According to Volume XIX’s edi-
tors, the Third Circuit at that time was one of the few courts of appeals that did not
have “the dubious honor of having its opinions systematically subjected to the well-
meant, and, hopefully, studied analysis and criticism of fledgling members of the
legal community.” Id. at 277.  We are grateful to our predecessors for having the
foresight to position the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW to undertake such a responsibility.
We share their goal to further the Third Circuit Review’s legacy “in the hope that it
will be of benefit to practicing members of the bar, to the bench, and to the aca-
demic community.” Id.
2. Id. at 277.
3. See Collins J. Seitz, Introduction, 19 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1974); Forward, 19
VILL. L. REV. 277 (1973).
4. See id. at 280 (identifying practical restraints as “precedent, the contentions
of the parties before them, and the state of the record”).  Chief Judge Seitz
continued:
At the same time, the reviewers must realize that their own mandate is
broader than ours.  If a decision is correct, but the statute that controls it
(493)
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view could become a beacon of intellectual activity providing authors with
space to consider the law not only as it is, but the law as it should be.
Over the years, the structure of the Third Circuit Review has evolved
considerably.  Originally the project was led by a dedicated Third Circuit
Review Editor and it analyzed opinions by category, focusing on federal
matters like admiralty and maritime law, constitutional law, federal juris-
diction and procedure, government regulations, and federal statutes like
the Clean Air Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.5  Members of the
bar occasionally contributed, and in 1979, six years after the Third Circuit
Review’s inaugural edition, editors decided to focus on publishing student
works, “both conventional ‘casenotes’ for reviews of single decisions and
more expansive ‘mini-comments’ and ‘comments’ for analyses of broader
areas of the law.”6
These casenotes were originally organized by topic.7  This topical cat-
egorization and the Third Circuit Review Editor position eventually faded
away as the Third Circuit Review began to feature longer, student-written
articles analyzing five or six discrete precedential opinions.8  Titled case-
illogical, the reviewers are obligated to bring to light the harmful conse-
quences that should require legislative action.  Such “in terrorem” argu-
ments are often made by attorneys to dissuade judges from following
admittedly controlling law.  It is as proper for law reviews to employ these
arguments in calling for legislative change as it would be improper for
judges to accede to them in deciding cases.  Similarly, law reviews are free
to call for the reversal of a precedent that, if made by our court, binds our
panel or, if a Supreme Court decision, binds our circuit en banc as well.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Various Editors, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 19 VILL. L. REV. 281
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 19 VILL. L. REV. 325
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 19 VILL. L. REV. 325
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Statutes and Government Regulation, 19 VILL. L. REV.
340 (1973); Kenneth A. Jacobsen, Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure Act -
Standing to Challenge Agency Action Requires a Showing That the Plaintiff Has Suffered
Injury in Fact to a Protected Interest from the Face of the Particular Statutory Provision
Allegedly Violated, or When Protective Intent is Clear from Its Legislative History, 23 VILL.
L. REV. 580 (1978); Various Editors, Criminal Law, 24 VILL. L. REV. 263 (1979).
6. Dieter G. Struzyna, Third Circuit Review - Preface, 24 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1979);
see also, e.g., Barbara A. Schneller, Editor’s Preface, 26 VILL. L. REV. 557 (1981) (re-
taining student-authored format); Gary A. Rome, Federal Practice and Procedure -
Comment - Appealability and Finality in the Third Circuit - Is the United States Supreme
Court More Appealing Than the Third Circuit, 25 VILL. L. REV. 884 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Various Editors, Miscellaneous, 26 VILL. L. REV. 861 (1981); Various
Editors, Constitutional Law, 27 VILL. L. REV. 616 (1982); Anne P. Stark, Editor’s
Preface, 27 VILL. L. REV. 595 (1982).
8. See Frances M. Visco, Editor’s Preface, 28 VILL. L. REV. 649 (1983) (explaining
that length of student-written work has increased); see also Carolyn J. Warter, Civil
Rights - Title VI - The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is Not a Prerequisite to a
Private Right of Action Under Title VI, 28 VILL. L. REV. 693 (1983); Esther L. Bach-
rach, Materiality of Misrepresentations Made on Visa Applications in Light of Current Con-
gressional Policy, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1046 (1986); Mary J. Mullany, Health Law - Provider
Challenge to State Medicaid Reimbursement Plan, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1081 (1992); Chris-
tine M. Kovan, Disability Law - Susquenita School District v. Raelee S., Pendent Place-
2
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notes or casebriefs, these student articles often combined critical legal
analysis with practical advice for litigating attorneys.9
Despite the focus on publishing student pieces, articles submitted by
nonstudent authors were occasionally included in various issues.10  In
1997, for example, the Third Circuit Review published a “Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts,” authored by the Commis-
sion on Gender and the Commission on Race & Ethnicity.11
Additionally, numerous judges have contributed to the Third Circuit
Review throughout its history.12  United States Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan wrote the introduction to the 1974–1975 issue to honor
Albert Branson Mars, a jurist who served on the Third Circuit, as well as
the Emergency Court of Appeals and as a district judge.13  Justice Brennan
reprised his role in the 1976–1977 issue by authoring a dedication to
Third Circuit Judge John Biggs., Jr.14
In 1983, the Third Circuit Review was dedicated to William H. Hastie, a
former Governor of the Virgin Islands and Third Circuit Judge and Chief
Judge Seitz authored an honorary introduction.15
In 1983, Chief Judge Seitz reprised his role to evaluate the Third Cir-
cuit Review’s purpose in celebration of its 10th anniversary.16  He en-
ment and Financial Responsibility Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Third Circuit’s Extension of Burlington, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1867 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Anna M. Maloney, Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: The Third Circuit
Clarifies the Securities Exchange Commission’s Rule 10B-5 in the Context of Public Misrepre-
sentations, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1171 (2002); Anthony D. Foti, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury -
Not in the Third Circuit: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in United States v.
Dejesus and Bronshtein v. Horn, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (2006); Brian J. Boyle,
Bright-Line Rules and Inefficient Markets: The Third Circuit’s 10b-5 Materiality Doctrine is
Ripe for Revision, 57 VILL. L. REV. 683 (2012); Carina M. Meleca, An “Officer” and a
G[old]man: The Third Circuit Finds Ambiguous Corporate Titles Jeopardize Right to Ad-
vancement Under Delaware Law in Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 60 VILL.
L. REV. 781 (2015).  The first casebrief appears to have been published in 1993.
Robert Ebby, Constitutional Law - When Does Guilty of Third Degree Murder Equal Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1153 (1993).  Additionally, when the
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW launched Tolle Lege in 2012, casenotes analyzing Third Cir-
cuit opinions were also published online. See, e.g., Douglas A. Behrens, Blinded by
the Light: The Third Circuit Curtails the Independent Ricci Defense in NAACP v. North
Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 58 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Gerald Seipp, Third Circuit’s New Role as Activist Court on Immigra-
tion Issues, 51 VILL. L. REV. 981 (2006).
11. Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 42 VILL.
L. REV. 1355 (1997).
12. Indeed, in 1981, editors began publishing the list of judges currently serv-
ing on the circuit; a practice that remained until 1998. See, e.g., Various Editors,
Judges of the Court/Table of Cases, 26 VILL. L. REV. 558 (1981); Various Editors, Judges
of the Court/Table of Cases, 27 VILL. L. REV. 596 (1982).
13. See William J. Brennan Jr., Dedication to Albert Branson Maris, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 403 (1974).
14. William J. Brennan Jr., Third Circuit Review: Dedication, 22 VILL. L. REV. 579
(1976).
15. Collins J. Seitz, Dedication to William H. Hastie, 21 VILL. L. REV. 431 (1976).
16. Collins J. Seitz, Introduction, 28 VILL. L. REV. 651 (1983).
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couraged editors to scrutinize the Third Circuit Review’s utility and
purposefully consider “every aspect of its editorial process, from the selec-
tion of the topics or opinions it will explore to the legal analysis it offers its
readers.”17  He encouraged editors to avoid simply picking cases for the
mere fact that they lend themselves to criticism, and instead focus on the
in-depth, probing legal analysis that presents the facts of a case fairly and
objectively analyzes the court’s proposition.18
The next judicial introduction came from Third Circuit Judge Rug-
gero J. Aldisert in 1985.19  He provided the following suggestion to “in-
crease the quality of professional criticism”:
If opinion writing is a fine art, writing a criticism is an even finer
one.  First, it is essential that the analyst pinpoint the exact legal
dispute between the parties.  Second, if the critic casts stones at
the opinion writer’s reasoning, the stone thrower should recog-
nize the distinctions among the court’s reasoning process, the
weight given to the arguments, and the court’s exercise of value
judgment.  To implement these suggestions, the critic must fully
understand the nature of the judicial decisionmaking process, as
well as the sophisticated structure of “legal reasoning.”20
Third Circuit Judge Doloris K. Sloviter echoed many of Judge Aldis-
ert’s points when providing the introduction of the 20th anniversary issue
of the Third Circuit Review in 1993.21  She specifically questioned the Third
Circuit Review’s topic selection process, noting the reasons certain cases
were chosen to be critiqued were “not always clear.”22  She nevertheless
applauded the topical categorization of student critiques because it al-
lowed “the law review to study the unique culture that each court develops
over time.”23  In that spirit, she suggested the LAW REVIEW undertake
greater in-depth analyses over broader areas of the law in addition to re-
taining the casenote format to analyze specific opinions.24
In 1995, Chief Judge Seitz appeared once again in the Third Circuit
Review; but this time, as the recipient of five tributes honoring his status as
a giant within the legal field.  Tributes honoring Chief Judge Seitz were
authored by United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehn-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Introduction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 828 (1985).
20. Id. at 828.
21. Dolores K. Sloviter, Introduction, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1089 (1993)
22. Id. at 1089–90. (“Some years the Annual Review has featured cases that
would be on any objective observer’s list of the most significant recent Third Cir-
cuit cases.  Surprisingly, other equally, if not more, influential decisions have been
overlooked.”).
23. Id. at 1090.
24. Id. at 1089–90.
4
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quist,25 United States Supreme Court Associate Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., 26 Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court E. Norman Veasey,27
Judge Sloviter, 28 and one of Chief Judge Seitz’s former law clerks, Beth
Nolan.29
The next judicial contribution arrived in 2002, provided by Edward
Becker who, at that time, served as Chief Judge for the Third Circuit.30
Chief Judge Becker’s forward provided an overview of the history and
practices of appellate mediation within the Third Circuit.31
The Third Circuit Review last published a judicial author in 2012.  In
his introduction to the Third Circuit Review, Third Circuit Judge D. Michael
Fisher illuminated aspects of appellate judging that he contends may not
be readily apparent to readers of legal scholarship.32  Emphasizing the col-
legial nature of the appellate bench, Judge Fisher explained how judges
work together to arrive at a particular ruling and how opinions are circu-
lated among judges before they are ultimately published.33  He also ex-
plained that because the court relies on litigants and their advocates to
“identify gaps in the law and present arguments for why and how they
should be filled,” the court is not well-positioned to opine on “ancillary
areas of the law,” preferring instead to opine on the issues directly before
it.34
Reflecting on the contributions made by judges, practitioners, and
students, we are grateful that the Third Circuit Review has endeavored to
sustain a rich body of scholarly analysis.  As we continue to move the Third
Circuit Review’s legacy forward, we are reminded of Chief Judge Seitz’s
original charge to combine analysis with perspective to provide value to
our legal audiences.
25. William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Judge Collins J. Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV. 545
(1995).
26. William J. Brennan Jr., The Courage of Collins Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV. 547
(1995).
27. E. N. Veasey, Collins Jacques Seitz Paradigm of Principle, Passion, Professional-
ism and Persuasion, 40 VILL. L. REV. 559 (1995)
28. Dolores K. Sloviter, Tribute to Collins J. Seitz: A Kind Man, 40 VILL. L. REV.
553 (1995).
29. Beth Nolan, Master of the Craft: A Tribute to Collins J. Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV.
565 (1995).
30. Edward R. Becker, Foreword, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1055 (2002).
31. Id.
32. D. M. Fisher, Issues in the Third Circuit: Introduction, 57 VILL. L. REV. 675
(2012) (“What I find intriguing in this issue of the Villanova Law Review is its focus
on outcomes. That is, the case comments presented here provide insight into the
substance of our opinions, but, through no fault of the authors or editors, can
offer very little about how we got there. This is not a flaw, but rather a simple
reality: the decision-making process of an appellate court is not entirely reflected
in the text of an opinion, though the ultimate decision is.”).
33. Id. at 678.
34. Id. at 680.
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After speaking with judges and their law clerks, as well as practitioners
and professors, we believe those who tune in to the Third Circuit’s deci-
sions would appreciate an effort that contemplates the Third Circuit’s ju-
risprudence in its totality.  By an analogy, this effort would provide for the
Third Circuit what the GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL’s Annual Review of Crim-
inal Procedure provides for the criminal law community.35  Thus, we are
enthusiastic to carry on the tradition of the Third Circuit Review’s student-
written casebrief model with a new feature titled the “Precedential Opin-
ion Summary.”
The Precedential Opinion Summary amalgamates precedential opin-
ions issued over the prior year, publishes their holdings, and provides in-
sight as to how those holdings fit within the broader context of the Third
Circuit’s jurisprudence.  Opinions that either decided issues of first im-
pression, received en banc consideration, or attracted concurring or dis-
senting opinions are highlighted.
Creating such a summary facilitates five objectives.  First, the summary
renders a service that no legal resource currently provides by simply hous-
ing Third Circuit precedential holdings in one quickly-accessible loca-
tion.36  Second, the summary helps scholars ascertain which areas of the
law are categorically receiving precedential attention, answering Judge
Sloviter’s call to pinpoint which legal doctrines remain stagnant and which
continue to evolve.  Third, by identifying the opinions receiving a concur-
rence or dissent, the summary identifies principles that remain unresolved
internally within the circuit or that may be subject to further dispute
outside of it.  Fourth, when practitioners confront unfamiliar legal ques-
tions, they can use the summary to jumpstart legal research.  Fifth, the
summary aids those who must track circuit law developments by providing
notice of a new or changed rule.37
35. See About the Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, GEORGETOWN LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/in-print/arcp/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2M7Z-FRDA] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
36. This fittingly comports with Villanova Law Library being a long-standing
repository of Third Circuit opinions. See Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY CHARLES WIDGER SCHOOL OF LAW,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit/ [https://perma.cc/8BX
B-ZTT3] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“As the official backup archive for the United
States Court for the Third Circuit, Villanova University School of Law maintains
digital copies of all opinions filed by the Court since May of 1994.”).
37. For example, consider the value of such notice to jurists and practitioners
in routine criminal sentencing.  In United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148 (3d
Cir. 2017), the Third Circuit held that when imposing conditions of supervised
release upon a deportable immigrant, the district court must “explain and justify”
its decision in open court “so that the appellate court is not left to speculate about
the reasons.” Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Notice
of Azcona-Polanco’s mandate would be of obvious value to district court judges who
must adhere to the Third Circuit’s directives when administering sentencing collo-
quies, as well as to the government and defendants who rely on decisions like Az-
cona-Polanco when preparing for hearings.
6
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The Third Circuit Review’s Precedential Opinion Summary also honors
the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW maxim of “Tolle Lege.”  Translated from Latin
to English, Tolle Lege means “take up and read.”  This phrase honors the
Augustinian roots of Villanova University and can be directly traced to St.
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity.  Upon hearing the instruction to
take up and read, Augustine quite literally took up St. Paul’s Letter to the
Romans and simply read it.  This momentary decision to merely read
proved to be life changing for Augustine—and subsequently for all those
who have since subscribed to Augustinian values.
The VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW and the Third Circuit Precedential Opin-
ion Summary approach legal scholarship through the lens of Tolle Lege—
striving to contribute relevant commentary that encourages the legal com-
munity to take up and read.  By embracing the Tolle Lege perspective, we
strive to add value to the legal community by challenging students, practi-
tioners and jurists alike to apply arguments, analysis, and theory in a way
that positively impacts our world.38
Guided by these objectives and our mandate to survey precedential
law within the circuit, the Precedential Opinion Summary took its maiden
voyage in Volume LXIII.  While we have set forth the summary’s initial
structure, we in no way hope that structure remains stagnant.  We en-
courage future VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW editors to further improve upon
the Precedential Opinion Summary’s format so that both the summary
and the entire Third Circuit Review remain responsive to the needs of the
academic and practitioner community.  We of course welcome all feed-
back in this endeavor.
38. See VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY OFFICE FOR MISSION & MINISTRY, TOLLE LEGE, xi
(2d ed. 2016), https://www1.villanova.edu/content/dam/villanova/mission/m
andm_assets/2016FINALFULLCOVER.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9JX-9VWF].  In
2012, the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW cemented its commitment to the Tolle Lege per-
spective when it introduced its online companion to the traditional print edition—
appropriately titled VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW TOLLE LEGE.  All articles published on
the online companion are provided a citation of VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE.  Since
2012, VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW TOLLE LEGE has expanded the Law Review’s ability to
contribute scholarship to the legal profession and encourage others to take up and
read the knowledge that exists in our world.  Students, scholars, attorneys, judges,
and even lay individuals need not look any further than the Tolle Lege citation itself
to propel them in their scholarly endeavors.  Several articles providing in depth
analysis of Third Circuit decisions can also be found on VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TOLLE LEGE. See, e.g., Robert Turchick, Is the FTC Playing Fair? The Third Circuit’s
Decision in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. Furthers Agency’s Data Security Efforts
but Creates Tension for Smaller Businesses, 61 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 71 (2016);
Travis Dunkelberger, Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators’ Sails in
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 121 (2015); John
D’Elia, Keeping FLSA’s Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law’s Reach to More Joint
Employers, Successors, and Supervisors in Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network,
60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 93 (2015); Keely Collins, The Third Circuit Lays Another
Trap for Unsuspecting Employers: Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 60 VILL. L. REV.
TOLLE LEGE 47 (2015).  For additional publications discussing Third Circuit prece-
dent visit villanovalawreview.com.
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On behalf of Volumes LXIV and LXV, we thank the students, faculty
advisors, and contributors who have grown the Third Circuit Review over
the past forty-six years.  It is in their honor that we answer Chief Judge








Executive Editor, Volume LXV
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW: PRECEDENTIAL OPINION SUMMARY
The Precedential Opinion Summary collects precedential opinions is-
sued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit between January 1,
2018 and December 1, 2018.  This compilation is designed to serve as a
research tool rather than provide comprehensive analysis on any particu-
lar opinion.  The summary is organized into two parts, civil and criminal
matters, and within each part by issues of first impression, cases heard en
banc, decisions with concurrences or dissents, and an appendix of opin-
ions arranged by subject matter.
CIVIL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
CLAYTON ACT § 4 – ANTITRUST STANDING – The Third Circuit dis-
cussed standing to pursue a cause of action by the purchaser of a product
against a seller when the product is in some manner connected to a price-
fixing conspiracy in the case of In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion.39  Chief District Judge Stark, writing on behalf of Judge Fuentes and
Chief Judge Smith, held that because the plaintiffs, as purchasers, were
pursuing claims against the parties that conspired in selling price-fixed
products, the plaintiffs were directly harmed.40  Therefore, the plaintiffs
had standing to pursue claims for antitrust violations.41  The direct line
between the plaintiffs and the defendants in violation of the antitrust laws
39. 881 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2018) (Stark, C.J.).
40. Id. at 274.
41. Id.
8
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made the case distinct from cases relied on by the district court where the
connection between the plaintiffs and defendants was far more attenu-
ated, which led the district court below to grant summary judgment for
the defendants.42  The Third Circuit reversed the order for summary judg-
ment and remanded the case for further proceedings.43
CIVIL PROCEDURE – REMOVAL – In Encompass Insurance Co. v. Stone
Mansion Restaurant Inc.,44 the Third Circuit considered whether a defen-
dant could properly remove an action to federal court in spite of the fo-
rum defendant rule when removal was issued prior to formal acceptance
of service of process.45  Judge Chagares, joined by Judge Jordan and Judge
Fuentes, held that removal was appropriate after conducting a statutory
analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1441.46  Next, the court decided that the district
court did not err by “declining to remand the matter on grounds of pre-
clusion.”47  Finally, given the finding that the district court had proper
jurisdiction, the court considered whether the district court properly dis-
missed the plaintiff’s claim.48  In analyzing the Uniform Contribution
Among Tort-feasors Act, the court held that the claim was improperly dis-
missed and accordingly reversed in part.49
EMINENT DOMAIN – TAXI MEDALLION AS PROPERTY INTEREST – In New-
ark Cab Association v. City of Newark,50 the Third Circuit considered whether
taxi medallions constituted a recognizable property interest of the plain-
tiffs.51  Judge Chagares, joined by Judge Hardiman and Judge Jordan,
noted that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim and sub-
stantive due process claim failed because under New Jersey law the plain-
tiffs held no cognizable property interest in a taxi medallion.52  The court
also found that the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, state law claim of
breach of contract, and equitable claims failed and affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of those claims.53  In issuing its opinion, the Third Cir-
cuit joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that “taxicab licenses themselves
do not carry an inherent property interest guaranteeing the economic
benefits of using the taxicab license.”54
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION – In Delaware
Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
42. Id.
43. Id. at 277.
44. 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.).
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id. at 151–54.
47. Id. at 154.
48. Id. at 154–56.
49. Id.
50. 901 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.).
51. Id. at 151.
52. Id. at 151–56.
53. Id. at 156–63.
54. Id. at 153 (citing Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis,
572 F.3d 502, 508 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9
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Protection,55 Judge Hardiman, writing for Judge Jordan and Judge Scirica,
ruled on two matters of first impression before the court.56  The first was
whether the court’s jurisdiction to hear cases under the Natural Gas Act
required finality of the underlying agency action.57  The panel held that it
has jurisdiction to hear only final agency action under the Act, noting the
“longstanding presumption that Congress intends judicial review over only
final administrative action.”58  The second issue of first impression was
whether the availability of a Water Quality Certification review by the Envi-
ronmental Hearing Board (EHB) rendered the initial certification by de-
fendants non-final.59 The court noted two features of the EHB review
process that indicate the initial certification constitutes a final action: (1)
the review does not prevent the defendants’ decision from taking immedi-
ate effect, and (2) the review before the EHB is de novo.60 As such, the
court held that the defendants’ initial Water Quality Certification does
constitute final agency authority, bringing it within the ambit of judicial
review under the Natural Gas Act.61
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT – In Levins v. Healthcare Revenue
Recovery Group LLC,62 the Third Circuit discussed the appropriate stan-
dards for bringing claims under several sections of the Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act (FDCPA).63  Judge Jordan, joined by Judge Ambro and
Judge Vanaskie, held that the petitioners stated a valid claim under section
1692e(14) of the Act because the debt collection company left an abbrevi-
ation of its full name in the voicemail in question, and it therefore did not
identify its full business name in violation of the FDCPA.64  In reaching
this holding, the court cited the fact that “at this early stage in the case . . .
the [plaintiffs] have plausibly alleged facts” suggesting that the company
misrepresented itself while trying to collect its debt, and cited similar cases
from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.65  However, the court held that the
petitioners did not state a claim under subsection d(6) or e(10) of the
FDCPA.66  Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal of the e(14) claim,
but affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the other claims discussed.67
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT – HIGHWAY TOLLS – In St. Pierre
v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau,68 the Third Circuit addressed for the
55. 903 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.).
56. Id. at 68.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 71.
59. Id. at 71–72.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Id. at 74–75.
62. 902 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.).
63. Id. at 279–84.
64. Id. at 280–81.
65. Id. at 281.
66. Id. at 282–84.
67. Id. at 284.
68. 898 F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2018).
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first time whether unpaid highway tolls constitute the type of debt obliga-
tion that could support a consumer claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).69  Judge Krause, joined by Judge Greenaway, Jr.,
and Judge Jones, found that this type of debt could not support a con-
sumer claim under the FDCPA.70  Invoking its own three-part test to deter-
mine if the unpaid tolls constituted a debt, the court asked (1) whether
the obligation arose from a transaction, (2) what property was the subject
of the transaction, and (3) whether that property is primarily for “per-
sonal, family, or household purposes.”71  After finding affirmatively for the
first factor, the court determined that the property—services rendered in
exchange for highway tolls—was not primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.72  Thus, the court held that the unpaid tolls did not
amount to a “debt” actionable under the FDCPA.73
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(D) – AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S
FEES – In Garza v. Citigroup, Inc.,74 the Third Circuit discussed whether
“costs” awarded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d) may include
an award of attorney’s fees from a voluntarily dismissed case.75  Chief
Judge Conti, joined by Judge Ambro and Judge Krause, held that “the
drafters of Rule 41(d) left the definition of costs open-ended in the rule
and only by statutory authority can it be expanded to include attorneys’
fees.”76  The court therefore affirmed the holding of the district court due
to the absence of such statutory language allowing the award.77  In reach-
ing this holding, the Third Circuit was persuaded by decisions of the Sev-
enth and Fourth Circuits on the same issue, but notably declined to follow
the district court’s reliance on a similar Sixth Circuit case which deemed
costs to never include attorney’s fees.78  The court likewise rejected the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, which held attorney’s fees may always be
awarded as costs under 41(d).79
IMMIGRATION – COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT – In Wang v. Attorney
General of the United States,80 the Third Circuit discussed whether section
6b(a)(1)(B) of the Commodities Exchange Act requires proof of material-
ity for purposes of determining an individual’s status under the Immigra-
69. Id. at 356.
70. Id. at 364.
71. Id. at 360–61.
72. Id. at 362–63.
73. Id. at 364.
74. 881 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2018) (Conti, C.J.).
75. Id. at 281.
76. Id. at 283.
77. Id. at 284.
78. Id. at 282.
79. Id. at 281 (citing Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121 (8th Cir.
1980)).
80. 898 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2018) (Nygaard, J.) (petition granted and
remanded).
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tion and Nationality Act.81  Judge Nygaard, joined by Judge Chagares and
Judge Jordan, joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that the provision
does not require proof of the materiality of the defendant’s fraud or de-
ceit.82  Using a natural language approach to statutory interpretation, the
court concluded that the words within the statute did not carry with them
a requirement of materiality.83
IMMIGRATION – JURISDICTION STRIPPING – In Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney
General of the United States,84 the Third Circuit considered whether a provi-
sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that strips federal
courts of jurisdiction to review expedited removal orders is an unconstitu-
tional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as applied to special immi-
grant juvenile (SIJ) designees seeking review.85  Judge Krause, also writing
for Judge Ambro and Judge Scirica, held that the INA jurisdiction-strip-
ping provision violates the Suspension Clause as applied to the SIJ desig-
nees.86  The court applied the two-part analysis of Boumediene v. Bush87 to
assess whether any attribute or circumstance barred the petitioners from
invoking the Suspension Clause as well as any substitute procedures for
habeas corpus.88  The court concluded that by satisfying the rigorous con-
gressional criteria for SIJ status, the petitioners demonstrated significant
connections with the United States and earned statutory and procedural
protections.89  As such, they were entitled to invoke the Suspension Clause
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the expedited removal scheme
did not offer adequate substitute process for the writ.90  Therefore, the
INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision unconstitutionally suspended the
writ as applied, and the district court retained jurisdiction to evaluate the
petitioners’ claims on remand.91
INSURANCE – FEE SHIFTING STATUTE – In Clemens v. New York Central
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,92 Judge Greenaway, Jr., writing for Judge
Restrepo and Judge Bibas, affirmed the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania in rejecting, in whole, the plaintiff’s request for over
$900,000 in attorney’s fees.93  In doing so, the court formally adopted the
position that fee-shifting statutes that provide judges with the discretion to
award fees also permit a judges to deny in whole a request for fees where
81. Id. at 344.
82. Id. at 348.
83. Id.
84. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.).
85. Id. at 158.
86. Id.
87. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
88. Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 166.
89. Id. at 167.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 167, 178.
92. 903 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr., J.)
93. Id. at 398.
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the fees are “outrageously excessive.”94  The panel found that the district
court had not abused its discretion when, forced to rely on the plaintiff’s
counsel’s “recrea[tion]” of his time records, the judge found 87% percent
of the charges to be “vague, duplicative, unnecessary, or inadequately sup-
ported by documentary evidence.”95  As such, the court was within its dis-
cretion to wholly deny the request for attorney’s fees given the “excessive
nature of the request” at the outset.96
INSURANCE – TITLE INSURANCE – In Lupu v. Loan City, LLC,97 Judge
Ambro, writing for Judge McKee and Judge Restrepo, determined the duty
a real estate title insurer owes to an insured when the borrowers assert
claims against the insured.98  The insured in this case filed a claim with its
title insurer after the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint.99  How-
ever, the third amended complaint did not contain the allegations for
which the insured sought coverage under the policy, and Pennsylvania has
adopted the rule that the obligation of the insurer extends only to those
allegations within the “four corners” of the complaint.100  Notwithstand-
ing, the court held that the insurer’s duty to defend arose when the plain-
tiff filed a fourth amended complaint, which did contain allegations that
would be covered under the insurer’s policy.101  Finally, the court held
that the “in for one, in for all” rule that is applied to general liability insur-
ance does not apply to title insurance, meaning the title insurer need only
indemnify the insured for the individual allegations that are covered
under the policy.102
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT – COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS – In
Cup v. Ampco Pittsburgh Corp.,103 the Third Circuit contemplated whether
retirees qualified as employees under a collective bargaining agreement,
and ultimately held that the “parties’ dispute over retiree medical benefits
is not subject to Section 6 of the CBA, [and therefore] it is not arbitra-
ble.”104  Judge Hardiman, joined by Chief Judge Smith and Judge
Restrepo, reached this holding after considering how precedent requires
that CBAs “be interpreted ‘according to ordinary principles of contract
law.’”105  Therefore, because the collective bargaining agreement did not
contain provisions regarding retiree health benefits, and the memoran-
94. Id.
95. Id. at 399–400.
96. Id. at 400.
97. 903 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.).
98. Id. at 385.
99. Id. at 388.
100. Id. at 392.
101. Id. at 393.
102. Id. at 394.
103. 903 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.).
104. Id. at 65.
105. Id. at 62–65 (quoting M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct.
926, 933 (2015)).
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dum of agreement did not incorporate arbitration, the district court erred
in compelling arbitration for suit brought by the retirees.106
PRODUCTS LIABILITY – MEDICAL DEVICES – In Shuker v. Smith & Nephew
PLC,107 the court considered whether the Medical Device Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted state law claims
when a medical device is comprised of multiple components and not all
components in the device are subject to the same regulations.108  Judge
Krause, joined by Judge Jordan and Judge Greenway, Jr., held that when
determining whether a device is subject to a particular regulation, the
court should assess the individual component at issue rather than the de-
vice as a whole.109  The court reasoned that the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act defines the term “device” as “not simply a finished ‘instru-
ment, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article,’ but also ‘any component, part, or
accessory’ of that article.”110  The panel affirmed the district court’s find-
ing that non-parallel state law regulations apply to this set of facts.111
REHABILITATION ACT – In Berardelli v. Allied Services Institute of Rehabili-
tation Medicine,112 the Third Circuit determined as a matter of first impres-
sion whether the Rehabilitation Act mandate of “reasonable
accommodations” generally requires that individuals with disabilities be
permitted to be accompanied by their service animals and “renders such
requested accommodations per se reasonable in the ordinary course.”113
The court found the service animal regulations were equally relevant to
the interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act as they are to the interpreta-
tion of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).114  Thus, the court con-
cluded, as under the ADA, an accommodation for a service animal under
the Rehabilitation Act is “per se reasonable.”115
SECTION 1983 – FIRST AMENDMENT ASSOCIATIONAL CLAIMS – In Palardy
v. Township of Millburn,116 the Third Circuit considered whether “public
concern” and “private citizen” requirements for public employee free
speech claims apply to a pure association claim arising from union affilia-
tion.117  Judge Siler, writing on behalf of the court, joined the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits in holding that the “public concern” requirement from
106. Id. at 65.
107. 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.).
108. Id. at 764.
109. Id. at 772.
110. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)).
111. Id. at 775.
112. 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.).
113. Id. at 120.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 906 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2018) (Siler, J.)
117. Id. at 81.
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Connick v. Meyers118 does not apply to associational claims because the
union activity of public employees is “inevitably” of public concern.119
Turning next to the “private citizen” requirement from Garcetti v. Cebal-
los,120 the Third Circuit explained that the requirement applied only to
statements made pursuant to an employee’s official duties, and that union
membership is not a spoken statement or an official duty of a public em-
ployee.121  Concluding that neither Connick’s nor Garcetti’s requirements
bar an associational claim, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s
determination that Palardy had not satisfied a showing of constitutionally-
protected conduct.122 Instead, the Third Circuit held that Palardy’s union
membership was worthy of constitutional protection.123
SECTION 1983 – EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM – In Ricks v. Shover,124 the
Third Circuit considered whether a prison guard sexually abusing an in-
mate can result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.125  Judge Rendell, writing on be-
half of Judge Chagares and Judge Scirica, held that “prison sexual abuse
can violate the Constitution.”126  To constitute an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation, the Third Circuit required that the incident “be objectively, suffi-
ciently intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official
must have a culpable state of mind.”127  For the objective prong, the court
declined to adopt a zero tolerance approach to all sexualized touching in
prison.128  The Third Circuit joined the Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits in making this determination, and permitted Ricks
to re-plead his previously-dismissed sexual abuse claim under this
standard.129
SECTION 1983 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – ADA CLAIM– In Haberle v.
Troxell,130 the Third Circuit discussed whether, as a general rule, the ADA
applies to arrests.131  Judge Jordan, writing for the majority, held that “po-
lice officers may violate the ADA when making an arrest by failing to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations for a qualified arrestee’s disability, thus
subjecting him to discrimination.”132  The court went on to state that “the
118. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
119. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82.
120. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
121. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83–84.
122. Id. at 84.
123. Id.
124. 891 F.3d 468 (3d Cir. 2018) (Rendell, J.).
125. Id. at 471.
126. Id. at 473.
127. Id. at 475.
128. Id. at 477.
129. Id. at 473, 479.
130. 885 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J).
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id. at 180.
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ADA can indeed apply to police conduct during an arrest.”133  The Third
Circuit joined the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in making this
determination.134
SECTION 1983 – ABSOLUTE QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY – In Russell v.
Richardson,135 the Third Circuit addressed whether court marshals are en-
titled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their official acts in enforcing
and executing a court order.136  Judge Krause, writing on behalf of the
court, held “quasi-judicial immunity extends only to the acts authorized by
the court order, i.e., to the execution of a court order, and not to the
manner in which it is executed.”137  The Third Circuit noted that immu-
nity is a functional question, and concluded that lawfully entrusted func-
tions of court marshals are fully protected by quasi-judicial immunity, but
that “the use of excessive force in the performance of those functions is
neither at the direction of the judge . . . nor a duty incident to the execu-
tion of the judge’s order.”138  The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to deny the court marshal quasi-judicial immunity in this
case because his actions were outside the scope of his quasi-judicial func-
tion.139  The Third Circuit joined the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
in making this determination.140
SECTION 1983 – EXCESSIVE ATTORNEY’S FEES – In Young v. Smith,141 the
Third Circuit considered “whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) permits courts to
‘deny a request for [attorney’s] fees in its entirety when the request is so
outrageously excessive that it shocks the conscience of the court.’”142
Judge McKee, writing for the court, noted that under section 1988(b) a
court may allow the prevailing party in a civil rights action to collect rea-
sonable attorney’s fees.143  Judge McKee also wrote that a court has the
discretion to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing party based on counsel’s
misconduct.144  The Third Circuit previously held that under Penn-
sylvania’s Bad Faith Statute, a court has the discretion to deny a fee peti-
tion when the amount requested is “outrageously excessive.”145  The court
formally applied the holding of that case to fee petitions filed pursuant to
section 1988, thereby affirming the district court’s decision and joining
the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, opinioning that “a court may deny
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 905 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J).
136. Id. at 247–48.
137. Id. at 250.
138. Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 245, 251.
140. Id. at 249.
141. 905 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2018) (McKee, J.)
142. Id. at 235 (alteration in original) (quoting M.G. v. E. Reg’l High Sch.
Dist., 386 F. App’x 186 (3d Cir. 2010)).
143. Id. at 234.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 235–36 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2019)).
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a request for attorney’s fees in toto where the request is so outrageously
excessive that it shocks the conscience of the court.”146
En Banc
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – TENANT’S RIGHTS – In Hayes v. Harvey,147 the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, considered whether a defendant landlord
could evict a family who had secured tenancy with a previous landlord
under enhanced voucher tenancy in conjunction with the federal housing
assistance program and 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B).148  The court held
that by interpreting the statute and consulting legislative history and Su-
preme Court precedent, the enhanced voucher program intended to
grant “tenants a right to choose to stay in their housing developments
such that their landlords may not evict them without cause, even at the
end of a lease term.”149  The court also noted that other courts have held
similarly, and that HUD’s guidance provides for similar outcomes.150  Af-
ter holding that the family had a right to stay in their apartment, the court
continued to consider under what circumstances eviction would be appro-
priate under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.151  Proceeding to discuss what constitutes
“good cause,” the court remanded the case to the district court for factual
findings on whether good cause existed in this case.152  Judge Fisher writ-
ing for the dissent, joined by Judge Hardiman, argued that Congress could
not have intended to give tenants the right to remain.153
CIVIL PROCEDURE – JURISDICTION – In Vooys v. Bentley,154 the Third Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, considered whether the court had jurisdiction to re-
view a decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.155  Judge
McKee, writing for the majority, noted that the key consideration in this
case was statutorily examining H.R. 6116, enacted by Congress to revoke
the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction of review for “all ‘cases commenced on or
after’ December 28, 2012.”156  The primary issue was whether the date
given in H.R. 6116 referred to the date a suit is filed or the date a final
decision is issued in the Virgin Islands.157  The Third Circuit had previ-
ously visited this issue in Bason v. Government of the Virgin Islands,158 hold-
146. Id. at 236.
147. 903 F.3d 32 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr., J.) (Fisher, J. dissenting) (en
banc).
148. Id. at 36–58.
149. Id. at 45.
150. Id. at 46–48.
151. Id. at 48–49.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 58 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
154. 901 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2018) (McKee, J.) (Bibas, J. dissenting) (en banc).
155. Id. at 174.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 767 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2014).
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ing that jurisdiction existed so long as suit was filed before the date
noted.159  Here, however, the court elected to overrule that decision and
hold that “Congress intended for the effective date for H.R. 6116 to apply
to the date an appeal from a final decision of the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court is filed and not to the date a suit is filed in the Superior Court.”160
Therefore, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the ap-
peal.161  Dissenting, Judge Bibas asserting that stare decisis mandates the
court retain jurisdiction to hear the appeal.162
Split Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – ARTICLE III STANDING – In In re Johnson &
Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices, & Liability Litiga-
tion,163 Chief Judge Smith, writing for Judge Chagares, affirmed the Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey in dismissing the plaintiff’s
products liability claim against the defendant.164  In doing so, the court
held for the first time that a plaintiff cannot claim that a purchase decision
of a correctly functioning product, in and of itself, could constitute “eco-
nomic harm” where there was no further allegation that the plaintiff
“failed to receive the economic benefit of her bargain.”165  Accordingly,
the plaintiff’s ex post facto wish that she had not purchased a product that
worked as intended, without more, did not meet the injury requirement of
Article III of the United States Constitution.166  The court found that the
plaintiff’s theory of injury did not fit into “any one of the three recognized
theories of economic injury: (1) alternative product; (2) premium price;
and (3) benefit of the bargain,” and accordingly the court dismissed the
complaint.167  Judge Fuentes, in dissent, argued that the third theory was
applicable to plaintiff’s case insofar as she did not receive the benefit of
the bargain.168  The dissent termed the safety of the product a “key ele-
ment” of the bargain that the defendant misrepresented.169  By virtue of
the misrepresentation of the material element of the bargain, the dissent
argued that the plaintiff did allege a proper injury-in-fact sufficient to sur-
vive Article III scrutiny.170
159. Vooys, 905 F.3d at 174–75.
160. Id. at 175–76.
161. Id. at 195.
162. Id. (Bibas, J. dissenting).
163. 903 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, C.J.) (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 280–81.
165. Id. at 281.
166. Id. at 290.
167. Id. at 282.
168. Id. at 294 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
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EDUCATION – INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) –
In Rena C. v. Colonial School District,171 the Third Circuit discussed whether
a public school district’s decision to pay tuition to a private school fulfilled
its obligation to provide a free and appropriate public education.172
Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Nygaard and Judge Greenaway, Jr., held that
“by agreeing, without limitation, to pay tuition at a private school, the
school district, as the local educational agency, agrees that the private
school placement is appropriate and that paying tuition there fulfills its
obligation to provide a free and appropriate public education.”173  The
court also addressed “whether or not the absence of attorney’s fees pro-
vides substantial justification for rejecting a ten-day offer.”174  The court
did not read the IDEA as forcing parents to “decide between the resolu-
tion of a placement dispute and paying for the attorney who assisted in
achieving an appropriate placement for the student.”175  Judge Fisher
held that “[a] school district seeking to settle a dispute in which a lawyer
has been involved should acknowledge that the parent has accrued attor-
ney’s fees and should clearly state if its offer includes the payment of any
fees.”176  The Third Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s holding that
“the absence of attorney’s fees in a settlement offer did not substantially
justify the parent’s rejection.”177  Judge Greenaway, Jr., concurring in the
decision, wrote separately to “discuss the difficulties certain kinds of ten-
day offers can create for school districts, parents, and, ultimately,
courts.”178
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT – TSA LIABILITY – In Pellegrino v. United
States Transportation Security Administration, Division of Department of Home-
land Security,179 the Third Circuit considered, as a matter of first impres-
sion among all United States Circuit Courts, whether Transportation
Security Administration screeners are “investigative or law enforcement of-
ficers” under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).180  Judge Krause,
joined by Judge Scirica, held that TSA screeners are not “investigative or
law enforcement officers,” and thus affirmed the district court’s judgment
that the defendant TSA agents are not included within the FTCA’s waiver
of federal sovereign immunity for intentional acts committed by law en-
forcement.181  Looking to the text of the FTCA, legislative intent, and pol-
icy, the court concluded that “investigative or law enforcement officers”
171. 890 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J.) (Greenaway, Jr., J., concurring).
172. See id. at 416.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 418.
175. Id. at 419–20.
176. Id. at 420.
177. Id. at 419 (citing Gary G. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 F.3d 201, 210
(5th Cir. 2011)).
178. Id. at 420 (Greenway, Jr., J., concurring).
179. 896 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 209.
181. Id. at 230.
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was meant to refer only to “criminal law enforcement officers, not to fed-
eral employees who conduct only administrative searches.”182 Judge Am-
bro, in dissent, argued that the term should instead be read to include any
officer with legal authority to execute searches for violations of federal
law.183  Petition to rehear the case en banc has been granted.184
IMMIGRATION – REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS AND DETENTION – In Guerrero-
Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison,185 the Third Circuit considered
whether “the detention of an alien . . . who has a reinstated order of re-
moval but is also pursuing withholding-only relief [is] governed by
§ 1226(a) or § 1231(a)?”  Furthermore, if section 1231(a) controlled, the
court need also answer “does § 1231(a)(6) compel an implicit bond hear-
ing requirement after prolonged detention?”186  Judge Greenaway, Jr.,
writing for the court, held that section 1231(a), the “post-removal” statute,
governs the detention of an alien with a reinstated order of removal.187
The Third Circuit reasoned that when a reinstated order of removal is in
place, “withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the underlying order
of removal; rather, they only potentially impede the order’s execution with
respect to a specific country” because “a removal order is unquestionably
final when it is first entered.”188  Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that
section 1231(a)(6) implicitly requires that all aliens facing prolonged de-
tention under that provision are entitled to a bond hearing and are enti-
tled to be released from detention “unless the government establishes that
the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.”189  There-
fore, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the defen-
dant receive a bond hearing and be subsequently released, but on
different statutory grounds; the district court invoked section 1226(a), and
the Third Circuit invoked section 1231(a) and section 1231(a)(6).190  In
his concurrence, Judge Rendell agreed with the majority’s reasoning and
result, but noted that neither statute adequately addressed how to evaluate
the detention of an alien with a reinstated removal order, and called for
legislative clarification for this limited circumstance.191  The Third Circuit
joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that section 1231(a) is the appropriate
statute to apply in this circumstance.192
182. Id. at 225.
183. Id. at 232 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
184. Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
904 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2018).
185. 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr., J.) (Rendell, J.,
concurring).
186. Id. at 211.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 216–17.
189. Id. at 224.
190. Id. at 211.
191. Id. at 228 (Rendell, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 227.
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Appendix of Precedential Civil Opinions
Administrative Law
Penn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. United States, 897 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Greenberg, J.) (affirmed) (concluding that the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board’s deci-
sion to uphold the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ refusal to
reimburse the costs of provider training programs complied with the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act).
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d
509 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (Scirica, J., concurring) (vacated and re-
manded) (holding Delaware River Basin Compact’s provision granting
Delaware River Basin Commission authority to review “projects” under-
taken in the Basin was ambiguous and remanded on issue of intent of
Compact’s framers).
Americans with Disabilities Act
Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.) (affirmed in
part and reversed in part) (remanding case to district court to reinstate
claims against the state of Pennsylvania for violations of ADA and due pro-
cess after plaintiff spent nine years in jail “for a crime that may not have
occurred,” but affirming district court’s dismissal of section 1983 claim).
Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Bibas, J.) (finding plaintiff did not plausibly plead necessity of a specific
accommodation in reasonable accommodation case where defendant of-
fered four alternative accommodations).
Antitrust Law
Lifewatch Servs. Inc. v. Highmark Inc., 902 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2018) (Am-
bro, J.) (reversing and remanding, holding that plaintiff company which
created cardiac heart monitors had stated claim that the Sherman Act was
designed to protect when there was circumstantial evidence of agreement
between defendants by parallel conduct).
Phila. Taxi Ass’n, Inc v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 339 (3d Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 211 (2018) (affirmed) (affirming failure to
state a claim because conduct did not constitute monopolization under
Sherman Act or an antitrust injury; the claim failed to set forth allegations
that demonstrated: (i) harmful, anticompetitive product, (ii) specific in-
tent to monopolize, or (iii) the dangerous possibility of achieving monop-
oly power).
Attorney’s Fees
Carroll v. E One Inc., 893 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, J.) (affirming
district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) after plaintiffs’ attorney failed to
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perform meaningful pre-suit investigation and repeatedly brought merit-
less claims then voluntarily dismissed them with prejudice after costs were
incurred).
Bankruptcy
In re Arctic Glacier Int’l, Inc., 901 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J.)
(affirmed) (holding res judicata effect of foreign debtor’s confirmed plan
precluded claims asserted by unit purchasers, releases in foreign debtor’s
confirmed plan barred claims asserted by unit purchasers, and enforce-
ment of releases did not violate due process rights of unit purchasers).
In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 904 F.3d 298 (3d Cir 2018) (Green-
away, Jr., J.) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (affirming bankruptcy court’s amend-
ment of approval order where a clear or manifest error existed in original
order with respect to a merger termination fee that was central to the
relevant legal calculus).
In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.) (hold-
ing claimant who filed proof of claim against debtor in bankruptcy court
consented to the court’s jurisdiction over his claims and affirming dismis-
sal of his claims).
In re W.R. Grace & Co., 900 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding policies did not
have to be specifically listed in order for asbestos-related claims asserted
against insurer based on its worker’s compensation policies to be covered
by channeling injunction, and “derivative liability” requirement should
not be interpreted to permit the injunction of only direct actions against
debtor’s insurers).
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petro´leos de Venez., S.A., 879 F.3d 79 (3d Cir.
2018) (Rendell, J.) (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (holding that a transfer by a
non-debtor subsidiary to its parent corporation was not a fraudulent trans-
fer under the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act).
In re Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, LP, 879 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Greenberg, J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing the bankruptcy
court’s holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred its review of fraud-
ulent transfer claims).
Civil Procedure
Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d 1124 (3d Cir. 2018) (McKee,
J.) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction against enforcement of
bathroom policy where plaintiffs failed to establish likelihood of success or
the risk of irreparable harm).
GBForefront L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29 (3d Cir.
2018) (Jordan, J.) (holding courts must distinguish between business
trusts and traditional trusts for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction).
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Gonzalez v. Corning, 885 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.) (af-
firmed) (denying plaintiff’s motion for class certification as not justiciable
under Article III because plaintiffs could not meet the commonality
requirement).
Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Smith, C.J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding that plaintiffs have Arti-
cle III standing but failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
because the “relaxed” Rule 23 standard is no longer the law followed by
the Third Circuit).
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding district court did
not err in finding that plaintiff did not exhaust available administrative
remedies for his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims; there was no
genuine issue of material fact concerning plaintiff’s excessive force claim
because he submitted grievance forms that specifically alleged excessive
force; the district court erred in resolving factual disputes concerning the
exhaustion of administrative remedies because the court did not provide
adequate notice).
Walsh v. Defenders, Inc., 894 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenberg, J.)
(affirmed) (holding district court properly remanded class action to New
Jersey Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction under local controversy ex-
ception to Class Action Fairness Act, finding defendant was a local defen-
dant against whom significant relief was sought, and whose conduct
provided a significant basis for plaintiffs’ claims).
Commercial Law
Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.)
(reversing district court and holding that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded
claim under Fair Credit Billing Act and Truth in Lending Act in alleging
that bank wrongfully refused to remove unauthorized credit card charge).
MacDonald v. Cashcall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2018) (Schwartz, J.)
(affirming district court’s determination that an entire loan agreement
was unenforceable because the arbitration forum listed in the forum selec-
tion clause was nonexistent and the forum selection clause was not severa-
ble from the rest of the agreement).
Panico v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 879 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Restrepo, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding Delaware’s tolling stat-
ute did not toll the Delaware statute of limitations in a lawsuit filed in
another jurisdiction, against an out-of-state party, based on agreements
governed by Delaware law).
Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Roth, J.) (affirmed) (finding court does not have to transfer action based
on forum-selection clause if clause is invalid or if the clause does not cover
action or claims that defendant is seeking to transfer).
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Constitutional Law – First Amendment
Conard v. Penn. State Police, 902 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenberg,
J.) (reversing district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s First Amendment viola-
tion case against her former employers after finding plaintiff “adequately
alleged retaliatory conduct by defendants that satisfies” all three prongs of
Mirabella test, and remanding case for reconsideration).
Corporate Law
City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., Inc., 885 F.3d 154 (3d
Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (holding officer of a corporation
could be held liable under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) for unsolicited faxes sent on behalf of the corporation; the use of
the phrase “significant level” in the jury instructions did not misstate the
law because the word “significant” does not create a higher burden of
proof; the district court’s explanation of the word “significant” to the jury
was appropriate because the court explained it in the context of the re-
quirement that the officer exercised active oversight of, or control over,
the conduct that violated the TCPA).
Clientron Corp. v. Devon IT, Inc., 894 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 2018) (Green-
away, Jr., J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding district court erred in
piercing corporate veil to hold shareholder of defendant corporation per-
sonally liable for portion of the judgment as sanction for misconduct in
discovery).
Education Law
K.D. ex rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2018) (Bibas, J.) (affirmed) (finding school district did not violate stu-
dent’s rights under IDEA because the school provided individualized edu-
cation programs that were “reasonably calculated . . . in light of the child’s
circumstances”).
Energy Law
Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 897 F.3d
187 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, sub nom. Adorers of the Blood of Christ, U.S.
Province v. FERC, 139 S. Ct. 1169 (2019) (Greenaway, Jr., J.) (affirming
district court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s claim alleging a Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act violation because under the Natural Gas Act “no en-
tity may seek judicial review of a [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]
order unless it first sought rehearing from the agency”).
Township of Bordentown, N.J. v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Chagares, J.) (finding plaintiff’s Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
claims lacked merit, finding New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP) incorrectly determined that it was preempted from
24
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providing a hearing to plaintiff to challenge issuance of pipeline permit,
and remanding to NJDEP for such a hearing).
Environmental Law
Giovanni v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 906 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan,
J.) (Bibas, J., concurring) (affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in
part) (barring claim for health assessment because the claim challenged
ongoing cleanup effort but finding medical monitoring claim not barred
by sovereign immunity because it was not challenged under CERCLA).
Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Trainer Custom Chem. LLC, 906 F.3d 85 (3d
Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded)
(finding the text and structure of CERCLA and HASCA require defendant
to be responsible for “all costs” involving environmental cleanup of its
property, including costs incurred before defendant acquired the
property).
Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease Holding Co., 903 F.3d 333 (3d Cir.
2018) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (find-
ing district court’s pollution cleanup cost allocation flawed where it used
volumetric data as a proxy for costs, failing to consider that some remedia-
tion measures cost more than others).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Hardiman,
J.) cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 1259 (2019) (holding Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act (FDCPA) one-year limitations period begins to run when would-
be defendant violates the FDCPA, not when potential plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered violation).
Schultz v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 905 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2018) (Vanaskie,
J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding debt collection letter that claimed
debt forgiveness would be reported to Internal Revenue Service may con-
stitute a violation of FDCPA because letter was misleading).
Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman,
J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding that under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act a collection letter that makes a “settlement offer” potentially
violates the Act’s prohibitions on misleading or deceptive
representations).
Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 898 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.) (af-
firmed) (finding FDCPA debt collector that also met FDCPA definition of
creditor was still a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA).
False Claims Act
United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128 (3d Cir.
2018) (Greenberg, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded)
(holding that district court in a False Claims Act action does not per se
abuse its discretion in reducing attorney’s fees below amount opposing
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party accepts as reasonable, but remanding on issue of whether prevailing
party may recover attorney’s fees incurred in litigating dispute over attor-
ney’s fees).
United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Chagares, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding False Claims Act’s pub-
lic disclosure bar is not implicated “where a realtor’s information permits
an inference of fraud that could have not been supported by the public
disclosures alone”).
Federal Preemption
Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings, LLC, 905 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Chagares, J.) (affirmed) (ruling IWPCA not superseded by FAAAA be-
cause impact of IWPCA’s wage regulation is too remote from FAAAA’s
deregulatory objectives regarding motor carriers).
Federal Tort Claims Act
Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr.,
J.) (affirming district court’s denial of plaintiff’s claims because she failed
to file her claims within six months of the agency’s written denial as re-
quired under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
Freedom of Information Act
Biear v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.)
(affirmed in part, reversed in part) (finding appellant exhausted adminis-
trative remedies and district court should have exercised jurisdiction be-
cause claim against FBI for failing to produce documents did not become
moot simply because FBI produced those documents).
Healthcare Law
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 888 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman,
J.) (reversing district court and granting intervenor’s motion to intervene
because it  had sufficient interest in protecting religious exemption from
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate and its interests were not ad-
equately represented by federal government).
Immigration Law
Bakran v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 894 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Shwartz, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part) (holding there is no fed-
eral constitutional right for person convicted of sex offense to sponsor
foreign spouse’s immigration application, but vacating for lack of jurisdic-
tion the district court ruling upholding certain protocols used to enforce
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, as protocols are committed
to exclusive discretion of Secretary of Homeland Security and are thus
nonreviewable).
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Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2018) (Shwartz, J.) (denying
review of immigration judge’s conclusions that immigrant did not meet
reasonable fear test for asylum where immigrant failed to show deprivation
of rights or prejudice arising from failure of counsel to attend asylum
hearing).
Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (finding plaintiff was not entitled to new bond
hearing as he failed to demonstrate how his detention under section
1226(a) was unreasonably prolonged due to government delay or some
other cause).
Lewin v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 885 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.)
(review denied) (declining petition for review because petitioner’s convic-
tion constituted an aggravated felony under the INA).
Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 884 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Vanaskie, J.) (denying petition for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ decision that appellant’s conviction of unlawful contact with a
minor was grounds for removal because the decision was consistent with
Congress’s intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses).
Ricketts v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 897 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.)
(motion to transfer granted) (holding that the Second Circuit has sole
appellate jurisdiction because United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York made petitioner’s nationality determination).
Saravia v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.)
(petition granted) (granting petition to review Board of Immigration’s or-
der denying application for asylum when Board failed to provide appellant
with notice and opportunity to corroborate claim).
S.E.R.L. v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.)
(petition for review denied) (upholding Board of Immigration Appeals’
interpretation of “particular social group” under Immigration and Nation-
ality Act).
Tima v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 903 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J.)  (de-
nying plaintiff’s petition for review where removal charge is based on a
post-admission crime because fraud waiver does not reach post-admission
crimes).
Williams v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 880 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith,
C.J.), cert. denied, sub nom. Williams v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 139 S. Ct. 863
(2019) (denying a petition for review when lawful permanent resident was
“properly found removable” for his forgery conviction, considered an ag-
gravated felony).
Insurance Law
Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d
445 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.) (holding that managed healthcare insur-
ance contract clauses prohibiting insureds from assigning claims to third
parties are enforceable under Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
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Migliaro v. Fid. Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 880 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Rendell, J.) (affirmed) (concluding that written rejection of proof of loss
claim amounts to denial when “based on it, the policyholder files suit
against the carrier, thereby accepting the written rejection of a proof of
loss as a written denial of the claim”).
Intellectual Property Law
Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of copyright infringement claim after
finding three-episode series created by plaintiff was not substantially simi-
lar to popular TV series Empire, despite the fact that defendant had a copy
of the script and DVD of plaintiff’s series).
Labor and Employment Law
Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643
(3d Cir. 2018) (Brann, J.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 167 (2018) (affirming
district court’s grant of summary judgement but finding employee’s state-
ment was not protected by First Amendment because “speech was made as
a government employee and not a citizen” and affirming district court’s
dismissal because university was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity after analyzing the Fitchik factors).
DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J.)
(affirmed) (holding that “an employee’s protected activity must be the
‘but-for’ cause of adverse actions to support a claim of retaliation under
the [False Claims Act].”).
Gillispie v. Regionalcare Hosp. Partners, Inc., 892 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2018)
(McKee, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment to hospital against hospital employee who brought action under the
whistleblower protection provision of the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act).
Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113 (3d
Cir. 2018) (Shwartz, J.) (affirmed) (holding judicial interpretation of pas-
tor’s employment contract with church would entangle the court in relig-
ious doctrine in violation of Establishment Clause).
Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018) (Rendell, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (rejecting district court’s holding that plaintiff’s
reporting delay caused by subjective fear of retaliation satisfied second
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense for purposes of summary
judgment).
Maritime Law
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 886 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, J.)
(affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (determining “[t]he
District Court’s judgment in favor of Frescati on the breach of contract
claim and the prejudgment interest award will be affirmed.  The District
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Court’s judgment in favor of Frescati on the negligence claim will be va-
cated. The District Court’s judgment in favor of the United States will be
affirmed in part with respect to CARCO’s liability on the subrogated
breach of contract claim, but the judgment will be reversed and remanded
for further proceedings in light of our equitable recoupment ruling for
the purpose of recalculating damages and prejudgment interest. The Dis-
trict Court’s order . . . denying CARCO’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment on its limitation of liability defense, will be affirmed”).
Liberty Woods Int’l, Inc. v. Motor Vessel Ocean Quartz, 889 F.3d 127 (3d
Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.) (Ambro, J., concurring) (affirmed) (holding Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) does not create substantive right to in rem
suits, and, thus, bill of lading’s forum selection clause requiring suit to be
brought in jurisdiction which disallowed in rem suits does not violate
COGSA).
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 2018) (Mc-
Kee, J.) (affirmed) (determining plaintiffs could not bring private right of
action under RICO because plaintiffs did not satisfy “domestic injury to
business or property” requirement).
Section 1983 - Bivens
Brown v. Sage, 903 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.) (Chagares, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reversed) (holding Third Cir-
cuit precedent, as opposed to precedent from circuit in which cases oc-
curred, must be used to determine whether prior cases count as strikes for
purpose of denying party to file in forma pauperis)
Section 1983 – Eighth Amendment
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 440 (2018) (affirmed) (holding U.S. Constitution does not pro-
vide right to cash bail or corporate surety bonds as alternative to non-
monetary conditions of pretrial release, thus criminal defendant failed to
demonstrate sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to support pre-
liminary injunction challenging New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act
under Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause,
J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded) (holding plaintiff
alleging unconstitutional conduct by multiple officers must establish the
personal involvement of each under section 1983; however, plaintiff may
maintain claim that officers conspired to cover up the conduct).
Section 1983 – Excessive Force
Murray v. City of Philadelphia, 901 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares,
J.) (appeal dismissed) (dismissing appeal for consideration of section 1983
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claim brought pro se by representative of the estate, because a pro se non-
attorney representative of estate cannot represent other parties in federal
court).
Section 1983 – Fourth Amendment
Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J.) (af-
firmed) (finding statute of limitations bared plaintiff’s section 1983 claim
for unreasonable search and seizure when limitations period began when
search occurred rather than when court invalidated the search).
Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment
Augustin v. City of Philadelphia, 897 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Hardiman, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding system of liens used by
Philadelphia to collect unpaid gas bills, combined with remedies available
to plaintiff-landlords under the Pennsylvania Municipal Claim and Tax
Lien Law, does not violate due process).
Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist., 905 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman,
J.) (affirmed) (finding plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due pro-
cess rights via alleged constructive discharge because she voluntarily re-
signed from her position of employment).
Section 1983 – Qualified Immunity
Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.)
(reversed) (determining court lacked jurisdiction to review district court’s
consideration of expert testimony and officers who used deadly forced
were entitled to qualified immunity from excessive force claims).
Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.) (reversed)
(reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment on grounds of quali-
fied immunity for police officer who engaged in sexual misconduct with
an assault victim).
Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.) (Roth,
J., dissenting) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgement on the grounds that “NJ Transit [is] an arm of the state and,
thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity”).
Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan,
J.) (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (vacated)
(finding officer had qualified immunity when officer did not have fair
warning that he could be subject to constitutional liability during a reck-
less police pursuit because standard was not yet clearly established).
Walker v. Coffey, 905 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.) (affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding prosecutors were entitled
to qualified immunity because it is not clearly established that an em-
ployee has the right to keep contents of work emails free from law enforce-
ment search under the Fourth Amendment, especially when the employer
produces the emails to law enforcement).
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Securities Law
In re Hertz Glob. Holdings Inc. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 80 Pension
Tr. Fund, 905 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed) (dismissing
putative securities fraud class action suit against corporation when plain-
tiff-shareholders could not adequately demonstrate “strong inference of
scienter required by PSLRA”).
Taksir v. Vanguard Grp., 903 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.) (af-
firmed) (finding overcharged commissions do not constitute omission of a
“material fact” and thus plaintiff’s breach of contract claims were not pre-
empted by Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act).
Tax Law
Spireas v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 886 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Hardiman, J.) (Roth, J., dissenting) (affirmed) (holding royalties re-
ceived under a patent license agreement should be treated as ordinary
income as opposed to capital gains because not “all substantial rights” to
the patent were transferred under the transaction).
Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Yahoo because plaintiff did not present evidence as to Yahoo’s capacity to
function as an autodialer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act).
Title IX
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018)
(McKee, J.) (affirmed) (holding district court properly refused to enjoin
the defendant school district’s policy of “allowing transgender students to
use bathrooms and locker rooms that are consistent with the students’
gender identities” because “the presence of transgender students in the
locker and restrooms is no more offensive to constitutional or Penn-
sylvania-law privacy interests than the presence of the other students who
are not transgender” and their presence does not violate Title IX).
Transportation
Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin, Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 904
F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, C.J.) (vacated) (vacating opinion and
judgment entered July 11, 2018 and granting petition for rehearing).
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES – FOURTH AMENDMENT – In United States
v. Clark,193 the Third Circuit held that police officers had impermissibly
extended a traffic stop when they questioned the driver and passenger on
their previous criminal records, and that evidence seized during the stop
was thus seized impermissibly.194  Judge Greenberg, joined by Judge Jor-
dan and Judge Vanaskie, noted that “[a] traffic stop becomes unlawful
when it ‘last[s] . . . longer than is necessary’ to complete its mission.”195  In
its analysis, the court noted that after officers at the stop confirmed that
the driver had a valid license, tasks related to the mission of the stop were
“complete” and that any questioning related to the driver or passenger’s
criminal history was not tied to the mission of the stop.196  Thus, the court
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the stop was impermissibly ex-
tended as well as its grant of the motion to suppress a handgun seized
from the vehicle after the “traffic-stop’s mission concluded.”197
GENERAL CHALLENGES TO CONVICTION – Judge Chagares, writing for
Judge Scirica and Judge Rendell, dealt with numerous issues of first im-
pression relating to challenges brought by defendants to their convictions
in United States v. Gonzalez.198  Foremost, the court determined that the
district court was not required to give the jury a specific unanimity instruc-
tion with respect to means of the crime charged.199  In doing so, it held
that the mens rea and individual acts requirements of the cyberstalking
statute constituted means and not elements, leaving them outside of the
ambit of charges that would require specific unanimity instructions.200
Second, the court held that the district court properly constructed a
“death results” instruction by including both proximate and actual cause
elements under two different theories of liability.201  Next, the court held
that the defendant could not claim protected speech as a defense because
her speech constituted either (1) defamatory speech or (2) speech inte-
gral to engaging in criminal conduct.202  In finding that the cyberstalking
statute as applied to the defendants did not violate the First Amendment,
the court noted it was in accord with many of its sister circuits.203  Finally,
in an evidentiary ruling, the court determined that the Federal Rule of
193. 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed).
194. Id. at 411.
195. Id. at 410 (alterations in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)).
196. Id. at 411.
197. Id.
198. 905 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.) (affirmed).
199. Id. at 185.
200. Id. at 186.
201. Id. at 189.
202. Id. at 192.
203. Id. at 193–94.
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Evidence 803(4) hearsay exception extended beyond physicians and cov-
ered statements the defendant made to a mental health professional or
therapist.204
HABEAS PETITIONS – FEDERAL DETAINEES – In Reese v. Warden Philadel-
phia FDC,205 the Third Circuit addressed whether a federal detainee may
challenge their pretrial detention via a section 2241 habeas petition.206
Judge Fuentes, writing for the court, joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
in holding that “a federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can
only be considered under the Bail Reform Act and not under a section
2241 petition for habeas relief.”207 The Third Circuit reasoned that al-
though section 2241 grants district courts the authority to entertain writs
of habeas corpus filed by prisoners claiming to be in custody in violation
of the Constitution, courts have long stressed that “defendants should pur-
sue the remedies available within the criminal action.”208 In particular,
Judge Fuentes noted, “[f]unneling requests for pretrial relief through the
criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of the issues,
maintains respect for the appellate process, and prevents duplication of
judicial work and judge-shopping.”209  The Third Circuit therefore af-
firmed the district court’s ruling that a habeas petition was not a proper
vehicle to challenge pre-trial detention of a federal detainee, as the Bail
Reform Act provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release
decisions.210
SENTENCING – In United States v. Peppers,211 the Third Circuit deter-
mined whether current post-sentencing law may be used when determin-
ing which Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) clauses a defendant’s prior
convictions may implicate.212  Previously, the Seventh and Eleventh Cir-
cuits held that only case law existing at the time of a defendant’s sentenc-
ing may be used to decide the merits of the defendant’s Johnson claim.213
The Eleventh Circuit has since changed and concluded that courts can use
case law post-dating a defendant’s sentence when deciding the ACCA
clauses into which that defendant’s prior convictions may fall.214  The
Third Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit, finding post-sentencing cases
may be used to support the defendant’s claim.215
204. Id. at 200.
205. 904 F.3d 244 (3d Cir 2018) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed).
206. Id. at 245.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 246.
209. Id. at 247.
210. Id. at 247.
211. 899 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2018).
212. Id. at 227.
213. Id. at 228–29.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 230.
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SENTENCING – EIGHTH AMENDMENT – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISH-
MENT – In United States v. Grant,216 the Third Circuit determined whether
“the Eighth Amendment prohibit[s] term-of-years sentences for the entire
duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy when the defen-
dant’s ‘crimes reflect transient immaturity [and not] . . . irreparable cor-
ruption.’”217  This case follows the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama,218 which held that “mandatory [life without parole] sentences
for juvenile homicide offenders violate[ ] the Eighth Amendment.”219
The district court at resentencing, following Miller, “determined that
Grant’s upbringing, debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-convic-
tion record sufficiently evidenced that he was not incorrigible and that a
[life imprisonment without parole] sentence was therefore inappropriate
under Miller.”220  The lower court limited its review to the “RICO conspir-
acy and racketeering counts” because those “received a mandatory life sen-
tence.”221  As a result, the lower court left in place the sentences for the
remaining convictions and imposed on Grant a new sentence of sixty-five
years without parole, or a release age of seventy-two.222  Grant appealed,
arguing that the sentence was “de facto [life imprisonment without pa-
role]” and thus a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.223  The Third
Circuit, in evaluating Eighth Amendment Supreme Court precedent, held
that “a term-of-years sentence without parole that meets or exceeds the life
expectancy of a juvenile offender who is still capable of reform is inher-
ently disproportionate and therefore violates the Eighth Amend-
ment . . . .”224 This holding “has also been adopted by a plurality of [other
circuit] courts[,]” including the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth
Circuit with only the Eight Circuit holding otherwise.225
Sentencing – Sentence Enhancement – In United States v. Glass,226 the
Third Circuit stated, “We have yet to determine whether or in what cir-
cumstances state statutes that criminalize offers to sell constitute con-
trolled substance offenses for purposes of enhancement under the
[United States Sentencing] Guidelines.”227  The court noted that a state
conviction does not qualify as a controlled substance offense if the ele-
216. 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr., J.) (Cowen, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285
(3d Cir. 2018).
217. Id. at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)).
218. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
219. Grant, 887 F.3d at 136.
220. Id. at 136–37.
221. Id. at 136.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 142.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 145–46.
226. 904 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2018) (Vanaskie, J.) (affirmed).
227. Id. at 322.
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ments of the offense are broader than those listed in the sentencing guide-
lines.228  Judge Vanaski, writing for the court, outlined that the First,
Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits all held that state statutes expressly
criminalizing an offer to sell are not broader than the guidelines.229  The
Third Circuit, however, declined to rule on this specific issue and instead
pointed out that the statute in question did not mention offers to sell
drugs.230  Judge Vanaski stated, “[a]ssuming a state statute that criminal-
izes a mere offer to sell sweeps beyond [the guidelines] we are not con-
vinced that the statute at issue here . . . crosses that line.”231 The Third
Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision to apply the en-
hancement because the statute in question was not broader than the
guidelines and so “it is a controlled substance offense and may serve as a
predicate offense to a career-offender enhancement.”232
SENTENCING – SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT – In United States v. Mayo,233
the Third Circuit addressed whether the defendant’s previous convictions
qualified as requisite crimes for a sentencing enhancement under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).234  Judge Jordan, joined by Judge
Chagares and Judge Fuentes, determined that there was jurisdiction for
Mayo’s motion under precedent established in United States v. Peppers.235
Next, the court applied the categorical approach to classifying Penn-
sylvania aggravated assault as a violent felony by comparing it to the
ACCA’s element of physical force.236  The court noted that the Penn-
sylvania conviction requires bodily injury and observed physical force and
bodily injury do not necessarily equate neatly; thus, the court held that the
defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault under Pennsylvania law does
not qualify as a violent felony and remanded his case for resentencing.237
In its reasoning, the court noted that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
reached similar conclusions.238
Split Decisions
HABEAS CORPUS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – In Reeves v.
Fayette SCI,239 the Third Circuit discussed what type of evidence is consid-
ered “new evidence” under the actual innocence standard, which holds
228. Id. at 321.
229. Id. at 322.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 324.
233. 901 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (vacated and remanded).
234. Id. at 220–21.
235. Id. at 223–24.
236. Id. at 224–30.
237. Id. at 230–31.
238. Id. at 229–30.
239. 897 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2018) (Shwartz, J.) (McKee, J., concurring) (va-
cated and remanded).
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that an untimely habeas petition is not barred when a petitioner makes a
“credible showing of actual innocence.”240  Judge Shwartz, joined by
Judge McKee and Judge Cowen, held that “when a petitioner asserts inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to discover or pre-
sent to the fact-finder the very exculpatory evidence that demonstrates his
actual innocence” this is considered “new evidence” under the actual in-
nocence standard.241  Judge Shwartz reasoned that this limited approach
“ensures that reliable, compelling evidence of innocence will not be re-
jected” and “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s command that a peti-
tioner will pass through the actual innocence gateway only in rare and
extraordinary cases.”242  The Third Circuit joined the First, Second, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in making this determination.243  The court
vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.244  Judge McKee wrote separately to highlight
the weight of the evidence that supported the petitioner’s claim of actual
innocence and the questionable nature of the investigation that resulted
in his conviction.245
PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT – In Rinaldi v. United States,246
Judge Krause, writing for Judge Fuentes, decided three matters of first im-
pression: (1) the showing required to establish administrative remedies
were not “available” under the PLRA, (2) whether a full examination of a
procedurally defaulted claim constitutes “exhaustion” under the PLRA,
and (3) whether cellmate assignments fall under the discretionary func-
tion exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).247  The district
court found that both of the plaintiff’s PLRA claims were barred for a lack
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and it further found that the
FTCA claim was barred by the discretionary function exception.248  The
majority of the Third Circuit panel held the plaintiff could show that an
administrative remedy was unavailable to him where, by virtue of intimida-
tion, (1) he was actually deterred from lodging a grievance and (2) the
threat would deter a reasonable inmate from doing so.249  The court re-
manded the First Amendment claim for proceedings regarding the “availa-
bility” of the administrative remedy.250  On the second issue, the court
held that, although the plaintiff failed to follow the formal grievance pro-
cess for his Eighth Amendment claim, he had still exhausted his adminis-
240. Id. at 160.
241. Id. at 164.
242. Id. at 164.
243. Id. at 161–62.
244. Id. at 165.
245. Id. at 165–66 (McKee, J., concurring).
246. 904 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.) (Scirica, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part).
247. Id. at 262.
248. Id. at 264.
249. Id. at 269.
250. Id. at 270.
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trative remedies by virtue of the full review of his claim on the merits by
the Regional Director.251 Finally, the court held that the assignment of
cellmates meets the “discretionary function test” and is thus exempt under
the FTCA.252  Judge Scirica, writing in dissent, took issue with the court’s
holding as to the Eighth Amendment claim.253  He argued that a review
on the merits should not excuse the procedural deficiencies of the plain-
tiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and would therefore have found that the
plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies.254
Appendix of Precedential Criminal Opinions
Appellate Procedure
United States v. Goldstein, 902 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.) (grant-
ing petition for rehearing with respect to Supreme Court’s decision in Car-
penter v. United States).
United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 2018) (Scirica, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding that federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider
appeal because untimely motion for reconsideration, even if decided on
merits, does not toll criminal statutory appeal period).
United States v. Renteria, 903 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.) (af-
firmed) (declining to adopt “reasonable foreseeability” test for venue
under traditional venue inquiry, finding venue proper).
Criminal Motions, Motions to Suppress
United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming motion to suppress handgun seized during traffic stop
because stop was effectively completed once officer confirmed driver’s au-
thority to operate vehicle, and subsequent questioning about criminal ac-
tivity to car passenger went beyond inquiry incident to traffic stop).
United States v. De Castro, 905 F.3d 676 (3d Cir. 2018) (Vanaskie, J.)
(affirmed) (finding officer’s request for defendant to remove hands from
pockets did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment when
officer spoke in conversational tone, was not demonstrating authority, and
did not use intimidating conduct).
United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming two felon in possession of firearm convictions and
sentences, where (1) officers had reasonable suspicion to stop, question
and detain defendant; (2) testimony regarding prior wrong acts supported
motive rather than propensity; (3) evidence sufficiently supported jury ver-
dict finding defendant guilty of constructive firearm; and (4) presence
and possession of firearms properly enhanced defendants’ sentences).
251. Id. at 272.
252. Id. at 273–74.
253. Id. at 274 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 279–80 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Hird, 901 F.3d 196 (3d. Cir. 2018) (Nygaard, J.),
amended and superseded on reh’g en banc, 918 F.3d 322, (affirming in part,
vacating in part, and remanding) (affirming that district court’s decision
to dismiss motion requesting charges of mail and wire fraud dismissed;
affirming perjury convictions of three appellants; but remanding one de-
fendant’s case for resentencing when judge gave sentence in line with ob-
struction charge instructions instead of correct charge (making false
statements to the FBI)).
United States v. James, 888 F.3d 42 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, C.J.) (af-
firmed) (declining motion to dismiss indictment or suppress evidence due
to defendant’s inability to establish legislative immunity under Organic
Act of the Virgin Islands for his conversion of legislative funds for personal
use).
United States v. Noel, 905 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2018) (Krause, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding motion for new trial was properly denied because defen-
dant failed to establish that motion was grounded on “newly discovered
evidence” and because defendant failed to produce evidence that a “spe-
cific, non-speculative impropriety” had occurred).
United States v. Thomas, 905 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr.,
J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding motion to
unseal court records was properly denied, in spite of presumptive right of
access to plea hearing documents under First Amendment, because com-
pelling government interests of national security would be impaired by
permitting full access to those documents).
United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr.,
J.) (Nygaard, J., concurring) (affirmed) (affirming magistrate judge’s mo-
tion to suppress because the judge was detached and neutral when deter-
mining that the warrant was supported by probable cause and thus the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied).
Due Process
United States v. Welshans, 892 F.3d 566 (3d Cir. 2018) (Restrepo, J.)
(Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (affirmed in part,
vacated in part, remanded) (holding prosecutorial misconduct occurred,
but did not render trial fundamentally unfair, and that obstruction of jus-
tice enhancement was improperly applied at sentencing hearing).
Fourth Amendment
United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding that traffic stop did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights because the officer had reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was speeding and “had a ‘particularized and objective’ basis for
suspecting that [the defendant] was engaged in criminal activity” so “ex-
tending the traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff was permissible”).
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United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming two felon in possession of firearm convictions and
sentences, where (1) officers had reasonable suspicion to stop, question
and detain defendant; (2) testimony regarding prior wrong acts supported
motive rather than propensity; (3) evidence sufficiently supported jury ver-
dict finding defendant guilty of constructive firearm possession; and (4)
presence and possession of firearms properly enhanced defendants’
sentences).
United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.)
(Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (Fisher, J.,
concurring in part) (affirmed) (holding the Fourth Amendment allows
the subject of a consensual search to terminate search by withdrawing his
consent but the subject here did not withdraw consent before police
found illicit drugs).
Habeas Petitions
Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 895 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Chagares, J.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 851 (2019) (reversed in part and re-
manded) (reversing in part district court’s denial of habeas petition chal-
lenging death sentence and remanding for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus directed to penalty phase on basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel).
Bennett v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 886 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Restrepo, J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing the denial of habeas
corpus and remanding to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus be-
cause the adjudication on the merits claim did not apply to petitioner’s
due process challenge; finding incorrect jury instructions were not harm-
less and were in violation of petitioner’s due process).
Greene v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 882 F.3d 443 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Vanaskie, J.) (affirmed) (holding that “alleged ineffectiveness of PCRA
[Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act] counsel cannot overcome the
consequence of the failure to present the IAAC [Ineffective Assistance of
Appellate Counsel] claim to the state courts”).
Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI, 902 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Greenberg, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and declining to apply Confrontation
Clause to admission of jailhouse testimony, because statements were not
testimonial).
Immigration
Moreno v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 887 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018) (Vanaskie,
J.) (petition denied) (denying petition for review of deportation order fol-
lowing conviction for possession of child pornography because the “least
culpable conduct punishable” is one of moral turpitude and the statutory
consequence is deportation).
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Jury Issues
United States v. Fattah, 902 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2018) (Smith, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part),
amended and superseded on reh’g, 914 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding the
juror’s dismissal was warranted, the bribery convictions would be vacated
and remanded, the evidence was sufficient to support Congressman’s con-
viction for conspiracy to commit fraud, prohibiting defendant from pursu-
ing certain testimony was harmless error, and evidence was sufficient to
establish that three defendants made false statements to a mortgage lend-
ing business).
United States v. Johnson, 899 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fisher, J.) (af-
firmed) (determining the error regarding lack of jury finding of bran-
dishing of firearm as basis for increasing mandatory minimum sentence
for aiding and abetting during crime of violence did not affect defen-
dant’s substantial rights, as would be required for reversal on plain error
review and armed bank robbery qualified as predicate crime of violence).
Sentencing
Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 906 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J.)
(petition denied) (denying petition for review when New Jersey attempt
law is coextensive with federal law by both holding solicitation as substan-
tial step to corroborate actor’s criminal purpose and, at date of peti-
tioner’s conviction, the federal list of controlled substances was identical
to New Jersey’s).
United States v. Abdullah, 905 F.3d 739 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding conviction for third-degree aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon is a crime of violence under sentencing guidelines and ca-
reer-offender enhancement was appropriate).
United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, Jr.,
J.) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (Schwartz, J., dissenting) (reversed and re-
manded) (holding district court erred in imposing a section 3B1.3 sen-
tencing enhancement because defendant’s position as an airline mechanic
did not involve the necessary professional or managerial discretion section
3B1.3 requires).
United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2018) (Shwartz, J.) (af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing) (holding
district court did not err in finding the defendant responsible for traffick-
ing 450 kilograms of cocaine based on co-defendant’s testimony and docu-
mentary evidence because evidence was sufficient to support the finding;
district court erred in applying the section 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement
because the government failed to offer proof showing that the defendant
willfully obstructed or impeded the administration of justice; district court
erred in calculating the appropriate Guideline range because it improp-
erly applied the section 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement when determin-
ing the defendant’s sentence).
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United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firming two felon in possession of firearm convictions and sentences
where (1) officers had reasonable suspicion to stop, question and detain
defendant, (2) testimony regarding prior wrong acts supported motive
rather than propensity, (3) evidence sufficiently supported jury verdict
finding defendant guilty of constructive firearm, and (4) presence and
possession of firearms properly enhanced defendants’ sentences).
United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chagares, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding that Supreme Court opinion in Johnson v. United States,
that residual clause in Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of violent
felony was unconstitutionally vague, did not start anew the one-year limita-
tions period for motion to vacate sentence based on vagueness challenge
to similar residual clause in mandatory sentencing guidelines).
United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J.) (vacated
and remanded) (finding conditions of appellant’s sentence contradict
one another, violate First Amendment, and were more restrictive than
necessary where the conditions lasted until appellant’s death, and were
therefore not “narrowly tailored sanctions” that were not tailored to ade-
quately match appellant’s conduct).
United States v. Metro, 882 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.) (vacat-
ing sentence imposed by district court and remanding for resentencing
because the lower court did not address critical factual disputes to deter-
mine the scope of conduct for which the defendant could actually be held
accountable).
United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (Roth, J.) (vacated
and remanded) (holding defendant should have been categorized as ca-
reer offender for sentencing purposes under the Guidelines based on
prior conviction for crime of violence).
United States v. Rivera-Cruz, 904 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.)
(affirmed) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) sentencing reduction remedy
is unavailable to defendant whose sentencing guidelines range is replaced
by a statutory maximum because the Supreme Court recently held the
same for a statutory minimum and Third Circuit recognized no material
difference).
United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2018) (Fuentes, J.)
(affirmed) (finding appellant’s sentence was not legally erroneous and did
not violate Sentencing Reform Act or Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319
(2011), when no indication district court imposed sentence to ensure ap-
pellant received drug treatment).
United States v. Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018) (Hardiman, J.)
(affirmed) (holding district court’s calculation of the defendant’s seventy-
month sentence for pleading guilty to commit bank and wire fraud was
proper because the Government did not breach its plea agreement with
the defendant at the sentencing hearing; the district court did not err in
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finding that the defendant’s actions qualified him for a sentencing en-
hancement under section 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) of the Guidelines).
Sixth Amendment – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Rendell, J.) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be ex-
cused from procedural default but ultimately finding plaintiff’s claim
failed under Strickland analysis).
Richardson v. Superintendent Coal Township, 905 F.3d 750 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Bibas, J.) (reversed and remanded) (finding sentencing judge did not
question plaintiff to ensure he voluntarily and intelligently waived his
Sixth Amendment right on second day of sentencing and plaintiff was
prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to challenge error post-sentencing).
Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 903 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Fuentes, J.) (excusing defendant’s procedural default on ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel claim where his post-conviction assistance was inef-
fective and trial counsel’s assistance was “manifestly ineffective”).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (3d Cir. 2018) (Restrepo, J.) (af-
firming former corrections officer’s conviction and sentence for aggra-
vated sexual abuse against female inmate where erroneous jury instruction
did not significantly mislead jury, and where evidence sufficiently estab-
lished use of force).
United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J.), cert.
denied, sub nom Wilson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2586 (2018) (affirming
district court’s sentencing of a defendant as a career-offender because un-
armed bank robberies count as crimes of violence).
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